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Bitcoin, the Commerce Clause, and Bayesian
Stare Decisis
F. E. Guerra-Pujol*

In most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of
law be settled than that it be settled right.
—Justice Louis Brandeis1
When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?
—Attributed to John Maynard Keynes2

INTRODUCTION
In South Dakota v. Wayfair, the U.S. Supreme Court
concluded that a state may compel out-of-state retailers to collect
taxes on sales to its residents conducted via the Internet.3 Yet
above and beyond retail sales, Wayfair also invites us to consider
some novel constitutional questions. Does the Commerce Clause,4
for example, now authorize state and local governments to tax
bitcoin transactions, criminalize the sale or use of sex robots, or
ban self-driving cars?5
Broadly speaking, bitcoin, sex robots, and self-driving cars are
specific examples of new technologies or new applications of existing
technology—technologies and applications that were unimaginable
when I was in law school6—such as blockchains or “distributed
ledgers” (bitcoin), virtual reality (sex robots), and artificial

Business law professor at the University of Central Florida.
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See QUOTE INVESTIGATOR, “When the Facts Change, I Change My Mind.
What Do You Do, Sir?,” https://quoteinvestigator.com/2011/07/22/keynes-change-mind/
[http://perma.cc/J93G-QPNG].
3 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2100 (2018).
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
5 I have chosen these particular examples because there is no direct federal legislation
(as of this writing) in these areas.
6 For the record, I attended law school in the early 1990s.
*
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intelligence (autonomous vehicles).7 My thesis is that the
development and deployment of these revolutionary Internet
technologies and platforms will not only require us to reconsider the
regulation of “commerce”; they will also invite us to reconsider the
nature of precedent. In particular, why should the past trump
change? In this age of technological change, why should stare decisis
be our default rule? Moreover, because our existing principles of
horizontal precedent are indeterminate, I will propose a new theory
of horizontal precedent, which I call Bayesian stare decisis.8
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows: Part I
briefly considers the taxation of bitcoin transactions to give the
reader some sense of the constitutional Pandora’s box that Wayfair
just opened. Part II then delves into one aspect of the Wayfair
decision that has broad implications for the future. Specifically,
when does technological change justify a departure from the
Court’s previous Commerce Clause decisions? Part III sketches a
possible solution to the problem of horizontal precedent. Part IV
summarizes my proposal and concludes.
I. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE: BITCOIN
The development of new Internet applications and
technologies, such as bitcoin, sex robots, and self-driving cars,
raise deep and difficult questions about the meaning of commerce
and the wisdom of the Wayfair decision going forward. Given the
lack of direct federal legislation in these domains, does the
Commerce Clause (as per Wayfair) authorize state and local
governments to tax bitcoin transactions, criminalize the sale or
use of sex robots, or ban self-driving cars?
For purposes of illustration, I will consider the taxation of
bitcoin as an exemplar or paradigm case.9 In particular, given the
holding in Wayfair, could a state now impose a sales tax on
“blockchain” transactions or a property tax on cryptocurrency
holdings? The answer to this conjecture will depend on how
blockchains or “distributed ledgers” are classified for tax purposes.
Nor is this an idle question. At the federal level, the Internal
Revenue Service published a notice providing answers to
7 For some recent literature exploring other dimensions of these new technologies,
see ROBOT SEX: SOCIAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 1 (John Danaher & Neil McArthur
eds., 2017); HOD LIPSON & MELBA KURMAN, DRIVERLESS: INTELLIGENT CARS AND THE
ROAD AHEAD viii (2018); see also PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN
AND THE LAW: THE RULE OF CODE 3 (2018).
8 See infra Part III.
9 For an influential treatment of the use of exemplars in the domain of knowledge
production, see 2 THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 144–45
(Otto Neurath et al. eds., 2d ed. 1970).
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frequently asked questions on virtual currencies like bitcoin.10 In
summary, the position of the IRS is that “[g]eneral tax principles
applicable to property transactions apply to transactions using
virtual currency.”11 Cryptocurrencies are thus treated as taxable
property, just like shares of stock or physical assets.12
At the state level, the regulation of blockchains and
cryptocurrencies is, as of this writing (summer of 2018), still an open
question. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws approved a “Uniform Regulation of Virtual-Currency
Businesses Act” in July 2017.13 Yet, state laws vary widely as to what
goods and services are taxable.14 As a general rule, however, the sale
of most tangible goods is taxable, while the provision of services and
other intangibles is usually not taxable.15 But there are exceptions to
the exception. Telecommunications services, for example, are subject
to a tax similar to a sales tax in most states.16
Returning to my exemplar—the taxation of bitcoin by state
and local governments—the answer to my conjecture will depend
on how blockchains or “distributed ledgers” are classified for tax
purposes. I, however, will leave that transcendental task to tax
lawyers and the courts. Instead, I will now ask a deeper question.
When should a court cling to its own precedents, and when should
it disregard the past? It is this aspect of the Wayfair case that
motivated me to write this Article.

10 I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, (Mar. 25, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-21.pdf
[http://perma.cc/8NU9-CDY2].
11 Id. at 2.
12 Id.
13 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIFORM REGULATION OF
VIRTUAL CURRENCY BUSINESSES ACT (2017), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/regulati
on%20of%20virtual%20currencies/2017AM_URVCBA_AsApproved.pdf [http://perma.cc/7DGJRL7A]. Although this model act has been introduced in three states (Connecticut,
Hawaii, and Nebraska), as of August 2018 it has not been enacted by a single
state. See Regulation of Virtual-Currency Businesses Act, U NIFORM LAW COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Regulation%20of%20VirtualCurrency%20Business
es%20Act [http://perma.cc/2E6N-TAPB].
14 See generally WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION: CASES
AND MATERIALS 841–43 (10th ed. 2014).
15 See id. at 659. As explained by Walter Hellerstein:
If a sale involves a transfer that is limited to tangible personal property (e.g.,
the typical purchase of goods at a retail store) or a transfer that is limited to
services or intangibles (e.g., a haircut or a right to display an image), its
taxability under a traditional retail sales tax is not in doubt. The former
transaction will be taxable as a sale of tangible personal property; the latter
transactions will be exempt as a sale of services or intangibles.
Id.
16 See, e.g., Gregory H. Wassall & John J. Sullivan, State Taxation of
Telecommunications Companies, 79 PROC. OF THE ANN. CONF. ON TAX’N 342, 342 (1987).

146

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 22:1

II. THE PROBLEMS WITH PRECEDENT
What is the primary purpose of precedent? Is it about
promoting the rule of law? 17 Is it about the creation of
community-wide and intertemporal coherence?18 The protection
of settled expectations and reliance interests?19 Or the laying
down of general rules?20 In short, legal scholars and judges have
articulated a wide variety of justifications for stare decisis. But
as I shall argue below, Wayfair shows why these justifications
are descriptively weak and normatively unpersuasive. Moreover,
whatever theory of precedent you subscribe to,21 stare decisis
poses an even deeper puzzle. Why should the past determine the
future in the domain of law? After all, it is axiomatic that “one
congress cannot bind a future congress” just as the decisions of
one president do not bind a future a president.22 Why should the
Judicial Branch be any different?
Stare decisis is an example of path dependence, or the idea that
the past matters.23 But from a normative perspective, it is not
obvious whether path dependence in law is good or bad on balance.
Some say that stare decisis for its own sake is a bad thing, or in the
words of then-Judge Benjamin Cardozo, “when a rule, after it has
been duly tested by experience, has been found to be inconsistent
with the sense of justice or with the social welfare, there should be
less hesitation in frank avowal and full abandonment.”24 Others
take a more benign view of path dependence in law. Justice Louis
17 See Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 111
MICH. L. REV. 1, 1 (2012).
18 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225, 227, 243, 251 (1986).
19 See Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Reliance, 62 EMORY L.J. 1459, 1459, 1506 (2013).
20 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION
OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 174–75, 177, 181–82 (1991); see
also Grant Lamond, Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning, THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 2.1 (2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/e
ntries/legal-reas-prec/ [http://perma.cc/TMT5-PSLB]. Cf. Larry Alexander, Constrained by
Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 17–19 (1989) (describing “the rule model of precedent”).
21 See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text.
22 See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Mother May I? Imposing Mandatory
Prospective Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 97, 98–99 (2003). But see
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J.
1665, 1666 (2002).
23 See generally S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and
History, 11 J. L., ECON., & ORG. 205, 205 (1995). Cf. F. E. Guerra-Pujol, Puerto Rico as a
Critical Locality: Is a Post-Colonial Puerto Rico Possible? A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the
Impasse Over Puerto Rico's Status, 20 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 561, 568–69 (2008) (applying the
concept of path dependence to the debate over Puerto Rico’s constitutional status).
24 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 150 (1921). For his
part, Randy Kozel refers to this feature of stare decisis disparagingly as “unadorned path
dependence.” Cf. Randy J. Kozel, The Rule of Law and the Perils of Precedent, 111 MICH.
L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 37, 40 (2013) (“There is value in a citizen’s power to advocate
her interests before governmental bodies and to receive an explanation for defeat that is
more satisfying than unadorned path-dependence.”).
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Brandeis, for example, famously asserted that “[s]tare decisis is
usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be
settled right.”25 Or in the words of Richard Posner, “The reason for
path dependence in law is . . . the cost of adapting to a sudden
change in law by changing practices adopted in reliance on the law
before it changed.”26
At the same time, judging is supposed to be a species of
critical thinking and practical reason, but to the extent that
horizontal precedent privileges the past, stare decisis tends to
foreclose the use of reason.27 But why? Why should law be
immune to reason? For as John Maynard Keynes is reported to
have said, “When the facts change, I change my mind. What do
you do, sir?”28 In short, how should someone committed to stare
decisis respond to Keynes’s query?
A. Competing Visions of Stare Decisis in Wayfair
In South Dakota v. Wayfair,29 the Court concluded that a
state may require an out-of-state seller with no physical presence
in the state to collect and remit sales taxes on goods the seller
ships to consumers in the state. To reach this result, however,
the Court overturned two long-standing Commerce Clause
precedents: National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue30
and Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.31 In reality, direct departures
from stare decisis by the Supreme Court are exceedingly rare, for
the Court has overturned a previous decision only a handful of

Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 561 (6th ed. 2003).
See, e.g., RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT 50
(2017) (“[T]he deferring judge might find herself compelled to ignore the lessons of
experience in order to keep faith with the past.”). Cf. NEIL DUXBURY, THE NATURE AND
AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT 2–3 (2008) (distinguishing between decision-making based on
experience and decision-making based on precedent).
28 See, e.g., Wei Li, Changing One’s Mind When the Facts Change: Incentives of Experts
and the Design of Reporting Protocols, 74 REV. ECON. STUD. 1175, 1175 (2007); Luigi L.
Pasinetti, The Cambridge School of Keynesian Economics, 29 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 837, 841
(2005). As an aside, although this quotation is often attributed to Keynes in the literature,
its provenance is contested. The genesis of the structure of this formulation (i.e. “when x
changes, I change my mind,” where x is “the facts” or “information”) may, in fact, be Paul
Samuelson, not Keynes. See QUOTE INVESTIGATOR, supra note 2.
29 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2094 (2018).
30 386 U.S. 753, 759–60 (1967), overruled by South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S.
Ct. 2080 (2018).
31 504 U.S. 298, 317 (1992), overruled by South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct.
2080 (2018). Quill, decided by a margin of 8 to 1, could be likened to a “super precedent.”
See Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204, 1205 (2006). See
Wayfair 138 S. Ct. at 2099 (overruling Quill and Bellas Hess).
25
26
27
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times.32 Nevertheless, although Wayfair is the exception to the stare
decisis rule, I will focus on a deeper jurisprudential question posed
by Wayfair in the remainder of this paper: How constraining should
stare decisis be? For above and beyond the Court’s contested
interpretation of the Commerce Clause,33 Wayfair also poses a
perennial jurisprudential puzzle: The tension between stability and
change. Or to borrow Justice Brandeis’s classic formulation of the
problem, is it more important for the law to be settled or for the law
to be right?34 In short, what is the probability that Wayfair itself
will be overturned in some future case, especially in light of the new
Internet applications and technologies that we surveyed above?
But before outlining the competing visions of precedent in
Wayfair, let’s restate the facts of the case.35 In 2016, South
Dakota enacted a sales tax law declaring a state of emergency.36
The bottom line, so to speak, was that South Dakota was not
collecting enough tax revenue. The law thus required some
out-of-state sellers to collect South Dakota’s sales tax on all goods
shipped into South Dakota.37 The problem with the South Dakota
statute, however, is that it effectively overruled two previous
U.S. Supreme Court cases, Bellas Hess and Quill.38 These
precedent cases imposed a bright-line limit on the interstate
collection of sales taxes: A state may not require an out-of-state
seller to collect the state’s sales taxes if the business lacks a
physical presence in the state.39 But the problem with this
physical presence rule, in turn, is that a state must rely on its

32 By way of example, Professor Jonathan Adler recently measured the frequency
with which the Supreme Court overturns its prior precedents. According to Professor
Adler, in the previous thirteen years (i.e., since John Roberts was appointed Chief Justice
of the U.S. Supreme Court), during which the Court has decided close to 1000 cases, it has
overruled eighteen of its previous decisions. Jonathan H. Adler, The Stare Decisis Court?,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 8, 2018), https://reason.com/volokh/2018/07/08/the-stare-decisiscourt [http://perma.cc/B5WT-2MUB].
33 Cf. David F. Forte, Commerce, Commerce, Everywhere: The Uses and Abuses of
the Commerce Clause, HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 18, 2011), https://www.heritage.org/theconstitution/report/commerce-commerce-everywhere-the-uses-and-abuses-the-commerceclause [http://perma.cc/PNU2-24A3] (“No clause in the 1787 Constitution has been more
disputed, and it has generated more cases than any other.”).
34 See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”).
35 If the reader is already familiar with the facts and the main issues in Wayfair, feel
free to skip this and the following paragraph.
36 S. 106, 2016 Leg. Assemb., 91st Sess. (S.D. 2016).
37 Id. Despite the South Dakota legislature’s self-serving state-of-emergency declaration,
the statute exempted out-of-state sellers who deliver less than $100,000 of goods into the state
per annum or who engage in less than 200 separate transactions for the delivery of goods into
the state per annum. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2089 (2018).
38 See S. 106, 2016 Leg. Assemb., 91st Sess. (S.D. 2016).
39 See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2091.
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residents to pay the sales tax owed on their purchases from
out-of-state sellers, and consumers don’t like paying taxes!40
A legal duel then ensued when Wayfair, along with two other
major online retailers (Overstock and Newegg), decided to challenge
the South Dakota statute in court.41 Since none of these business
firms had a physical presence in South Dakota, the lower courts
followed precedent and ruled in their favor.42 So far, so good. But
South Dakota officials rolled the dice and appealed all the way up to
the U.S. Supreme Court, and their gamble paid off. Five Justices
(a bare majority) voted to overrule their Court’s previous
precedents.43 Thus, beyond the Commerce Clause question, Wayfair
poses a deeper question about stare decisis. To be clear, this deeper
question was not about the scope of the Quill precedent but rather
about its strength. Specifically, when is a court justified in
overturning its own precedents?
In particular, Wayfair poses the problem of horizontal
precedent, the obligation of a court to follow the decisions by the
same court in previous cases.44 Accordingly, this paper will put
aside the practice of vertical precedent, or the obligation of a
lower court to obey the decisions of a court above it in the judicial
hierarchy.45 It is one thing for a lower court to follow the chain
of command, but why should the highest court of a legal
jurisdiction, such as the U.S. Supreme Court, be bound by its
own previous decisions?
The Wayfair Court split 5 to 4 on the question of stare
decisis.46 Consider first the majority opinion by Justice Kennedy.
In justifying the Court’s decision to depart from stare decisis, the
majority opinion emphasizes the changes that have occurred
since the precedent cases were decided:
[T]he real world implementation of Commerce Clause doctrines now
makes it manifest that the physical presence rule as defined by Quill
must give way to the “far-reaching systemic and structural changes in
the economy” and “many other societal dimensions” caused by the
Cyber Age. Though Quill was wrong on its own terms when it was

40 Or in the words of the Wayfair court: “consumer compliance rates are notoriously
low.” Id. at 2088 (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-114, REPORT TO
CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS: SALES TAXES, STATES COULD GAIN REVENUE FROM EXPANDED
AUTHORITY, BUT BUSINESSES ARE LIKELY TO EXPERIENCE COMPLIANCE COSTS 5 (2017)).
41 Id. at 2089.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 2087.
44 IAN MCLEOD, LEGAL METHOD 153–59 (2d. ed. 1996).
45 Id.
46 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2087.
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decided in 1992, since then the Internet revolution has made its
earlier error all the more egregious and harmful.47

In other words, a precedent must give way when the conditions that
produced that precedent have changed. When the facts change, so
should the law.
By contrast, the dissent emphasizes the disruption and
transition costs that will follow from the Court’s decision to overturn
its precedents:
I agree that Bellas Hess was wrongly decided, for many of the reasons
given by the Court. The Court argues in favor of overturning that
decision because the “Internet’s prevalence and power have changed
the dynamics of the national economy.” But that is the very reason I
oppose discarding the physical-presence rule. E-commerce has grown
into a significant and vibrant part of our national economy against the
backdrop of established rules, including the physical-presence rule.
Any alteration to those rules with the potential to disrupt the
development of such a critical segment of the economy should be
undertaken by Congress. The Court should not act on this important
question of current economic policy, solely to expiate a mistake it
made over 50 years ago.48

Simply put, it is more important that the law be settled than
right. Error is costly, but so too is change. Wayfair thus presents
competing visions of the strength of stare decisis. It is thus the
perfect case to test our intuitions and theories of stare decisis.
B. The Stare Decisis Swamp
Wayfair shows there are different ways of drawing the line
between stability and change. Many judges, following the lead of
Judge Cardozo, would draw the line on pragmatic or consequentialist
grounds, or in the eloquent words of Judge Cardozo: “when a rule,
after it has been duly tested by experience, has been found to be
inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the social welfare, there
should be less hesitation in frank avowal and full abandonment.”49
The problem with such prudential or pragmatic justifications,
however, is that there are also many prudential and pragmatic
reasons for respecting precedent, even flawed precedent.50 Judges
have identified a plethora of reasons for deferring to a previous
decision, even when there is a consensus that the prior case was
wrongly decided.51 These reasons include the promotion of judicial

47
48
49
50
51

Id. at 2097 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 2101 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
CARDOZO, supra note 24, at 150.
See, e.g., KOZEL, supra note 27, at 36–42, 46–48.
Id. at 36–49.
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efficiency, the advancement of collective wisdom, the furtherance
of uniformity and common ground, and the protection of reliance
interests.52 Of these justifications for stare decisis, reliance is the
most important, so I begin there.
The relationship between precedent and reliance is a close
one: Once a court decides a question of law, various actors may
take the court’s decision into account, modifying their behavior in
light of the court’s previous decision. It would thus be unfair for a
court to upset the settled expectations of parties who have relied
on that court’s own past decisions to organize their affairs.53
These reliance interests are especially salient in a commercial
context, such as entering into a contract or setting up a business.
Although the protection of reliance interests is one of the
most prevalent justifications for deference to precedent,54 it turns
out that this justification is flimsy and unpersuasive. In
particular, there are several problems with the reliance
argument. One is the problem of multiple stakeholders. Another
is that reliance is misplaced when conditions have changed. Yet
another is the problem of abusive or unreasonable expectations.
I will explore each of these problems below.
The main problem with the reliance theory of precedent is the
problem of multiple stakeholders. In brief, any given precedent will
have multiple stakeholders, and these various stakeholders may
have varying reliance interests and competing expectations about
the soundness of a precedent and about the transition costs of
overturning a precedent. Furthermore, Wayfair itself provides a
textbook illustration of these problems with the reliance theory of
precedent. In Wayfair, the competing stakeholders were the States,
who wanted to collect additional tax revenues, and Internet retailers
like Wayfair and Overstock, who wanted to avoid the burdens of
direct taxation in states where they had no physical presence.55
But even if there were a single stakeholder (as opposed to
multiple stakeholders), or even if the multiple stakeholders shared
the exact same reliance interests, the reliance theory of precedent
would still be unsound for two additional reasons. One is the
possibility of misplaced reliance. The other is the possibility of
abusive or strategic reliance.

52 See generally Campbell H. Black, The Principle of Stare Decisis, 34 AM. L. REG.
(1852–1891) 745 (1886).
53 See, e.g., Walter v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 673, (“The doctrine [of stare decisis] exists
for the purpose of introducing certainty and stability into the law and protecting the
expectations of individuals and institutions that have acted in reliance on existing rules.”).
54 Kozel, supra note 19, at 1459.
55 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2089.
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Reliance might be “misplaced,” especially when the
economic or social conditions on which a previous decision was
based have changed, or in the words of Judge Richard Posner,
“[w]e would . . . expect, and we find, that stare decisis is less
rigidly adhered to the more rapidly the society is changing.”56
Namely, the possibility of a Wayfair-like decision—of a precedent
case being overturned due to changing condition—is thus a
known risk of litigation. In the words of Judge Cardozo, this is “a
fair risk of the game of life, not different in degree from the risk
of any other misconception of right or duty.”57
That is to say, there are no absolutes in life, even in the domain
of precedent. Specifically, even when the Supreme Court is paying
lip service to the doctrine of stare decisis, it has consistently stated
that all precedents are subject to revision. Since courts have the
discretion to overrule their previous decisions, one could argue
“reliance on a flawed precedent should be treated as a calculated
risk.”58 On this view, reliance on a court’s decision, knowing full
well that precedents can be overturned, is like placing a bet. This
probabilistic view of precedent, in turn, poses a new question: How
should these probabilities be calculated?
The other reason why reliance is a weak argument is the
problem of abusive or unreasonable expectations. Once again, the
Wayfair case provides a textbook illustration of this problem.
Although the Court acknowledges that “[r]eliance interests are a
legitimate consideration when the Court weighs adherence to an
earlier but flawed precedent,” it also suggests that some of the
reliance on Quill was improperly motivated.59 In particular, some
Internet retailers were hoping to gain an unfair advantage over
firms with a physical presence in a taxing jurisdiction. According
to the Court, “[s]ome remote retailers go so far as to advertise
sales as tax free.”60 The Court denigrates the reliance of
out-of-state Internet retailers thus: “[A] business ‘is in no
position to found a constitutional right . . . on the practical
opportunities for tax avoidance.’”61
But this line of reasoning in the Wayfair Court’s majority
opinion poses a new problem: How does one distinguish between
legitimate expectations (those that deserve to be protected) and
undeserving or unscrupulous ones? What if only “some” parties

56
57
58
59
60
61

POSNER, supra note 26, at 560.
CARDOZO, supra note 24, at 148.
KOZEL, supra note 27, at 48.
South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2098 (2018).
Id.
Id. at 2086 (quoting Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 366 (1941)).
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have such unreasonable expectations? Where should a court
draw the line?
Aside from reliance, another justification for stare decisis is
that it promotes the “rule of law.”62 But as Professor Randy Kozel
has shown, this justification is far from obvious, since the
“rule-of-law benefits of stare decisis are invariably accompanied
by rule-of-law costs.”63 One could even argue that the doctrine of
stare decisis does more harm than good to the rule of law.64 How
does stare decisis harm the rule of law? By privileging stability
over accuracy and thus obstructing the use of reason. Judges who
follow precedent don’t ask, what is the best way of deciding this
case? Instead, stare decisis requires judges to ask a different
question: Have we decided this question before? But there is no
necessary logical relation between the timing of a decision and its
accuracy.65 In short, the doctrine of stare decisis not only makes
it more difficult to overturn a flawed precedent; it also hinders
the use of reason.
For its part, Wayfair is a textbook illustration of this
anti-stare-decisis argument: “If it becomes apparent that the
Court’s Commerce Clause decisions prohibit the States from
exercising their lawful sovereign powers in our federal system,
the Court should be vigilant in correcting the error.”66 In other
words, courts should fix their mistakes instead of abiding by and
perpetuating them, especially in cases involving constitutional
interpretation. Or in the words of the late Justice Antonin Scalia,
“[t]he whole function of [stare decisis] is to make us say that
what is false under proper analysis must nonetheless be held to
be true . . . .”67 According to Justice Scalia, his oath as a Justice
was to support and defend the Constitution, not to support and
defend his predecessors’ interpretations of the Constitution.68
Another justification for stare decisis is predictability or
stability. Even a champion of the pragmatic view like Judge
Cardozo concedes “[t]he situation would . . . be intolerable if the
weekly changes in the composition of the court were accompanied
62 See Waldron, supra note 17, at 3–4. As an aside, “rule of law” can mean different
things to different people. By “rule of law,” I mean the idea that every person—including
lawmakers and judges—must obey the law.
63 Kozel, supra note 24, at 38.
64 Id. at 41 (“Deferring to precedent can generate rule-of-law costs that may offset
the countervailing benefits.”).
65 See, e.g., Arbora Resulaj et al., Changes of Mind in Decision-Making, 461 NATURE
263, 263 (2009).
66 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2096.
67 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 139 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
68 See id.
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by changes in its rulings.”69 By way of example, Quill was
decided by a vote of 8 to 1, while Wayfair was decided by a 5 to 4
vote. But at the same time, only two Justices who participated in
the precedent case (Quill) also took part in the subsequent case
(Wayfair).70 Although a generational span of over twenty-five
years separates both decisions, one is tempted to believe that the
replacement of the other seven Justices with new ones during
this span of time played a significant role in the outcome of the
subsequent case.71
Yet another justification for the rule of stare decisis is judicial
efficiency. Even a pragmatist like Judge Cardozo concedes: “the
labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if
every past decision could be reopened in every case . . . .”72 This
concern (judicial efficiency) is especially salient in Commerce
Clause cases, since most legislation has some connection, however
tenuous, to commerce and since so much local legislation is
protectionist in nature.73 If ever there were an area of law where
stability mattered more than getting it right, it would be the
Commerce Clause. But why should efficiency trump accuracy?
In short, the arguments in favor of precedent turn out to
be rather flimsy and unpersuasive. In truth, stare decisis is an
indeterminate doctrine.
C. The Bottom Line: Horizontal Precedent is Indeterminate
Stare decisis is an indeterminate doctrine because it is easy to
find a reason for overruling a previous precedent when the
precedent case is wrong. True, when a previous case is deemed to
be wrongly decided, judges are supposed to apply precedent unless
there is a good reason or special justification for overruling it.74
But the problem with this test is that it is not very demanding.

CARDOZO, supra note 24, at 150.
Anthony Kennedy and Clarence Thomas were the only Justices who participated
in both decisions. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992); Wayfair, 138 S.
Ct. at 2080.
71 The careful reader will notice that I hedged my previous statement with the words
“tempted to believe.” I did this because, in fact, both Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas
changed their minds regarding the correctness of Quill and ended up voting to overturn
their Court’s own precedent. That is, they both thought in good faith that the error in
Quill was sufficiently egregious to justify overturning it. Cf. CARDOZO, supra note 24, at
158 (“The United States Supreme Court and the highest courts of the several states
overrule their own prior decisions when manifestly erroneous.”).
72 CARDOZO, supra note 24, at 149.
73 See, e.g., Wendy E. Takacs, Pressures for Protectionism: An Empirical Analysis 19
ECON. INQUIRY 687, 691–92 (1981).
74 Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992) (“[A] decision
to overrule should rest on some special reason over and above the belief that a prior case
was wrongly decided.”).
69
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How hard can it be for a creative or motivated judge to find a
“special reason” when he needs one? Wayfair itself is a textbook
illustration of this problem.
In Wayfair that “special reason” was the unfairness of the
physical presence rule. Specifically, the Court claims that the
physical presence rule creates an “unfair and unjust” tax loophole:
The [physical presence rule] is unfair and unjust to those competitors,
both local and out of State, who must remit the tax; to the consumers
who pay the tax; and to the States that seek fair enforcement of the
sales tax, a tax many States for many years have considered an
indispensable source for raising revenue.75

The Court also goes on to say that “there is nothing unfair about
requiring companies that avail themselves of the States’ benefits
to bear an equal share of the burden of tax collection.”76
In other words, the physical presence rule harms two
different groups of people. Since this rule makes it more difficult
for states to collect sales taxes from out-of-state sellers with no
physical presence in their state, it harms tax collectors in remote
places like South Dakota. And it also harms business firms who
do happen to have a physical presence in South Dakota, since
they must collect and remit sales taxes on their in-state sales,
while their competitors (the ones with no physical presence in
South Dakota) do not.
For my part, I do not dispute that the physical presence rule
is unfair, since it creates serious harms and economic distortions.77
The problem with this argument, however, is that getting rid of
the physical presence rule is also unfair and will likewise produce
serious harms and distortions.78 In short, by overturning its
pro-physical-presence precedents, the Court’s decision will harm
consumers as well as out-of-state sellers, or in the words of Chief
Justice Roberts’ dissenting opinion: “[T]he marketplace itself
could be affected by abandoning the physical-presence rule. The
[majority’s] focus on unfairness and injustice does not appear to
embrace consideration of that current public policy concern.”79

South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2096 (2018).
Id.
See, e.g., Sarah Horn et al., Supreme Court Abandons Physical Presence
Standard: An In-Depth Look at South Dakota v. Wayfair, THOMSON REUTERS (June
22, 2018), https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/news/supreme-court-abandons-physical-presencestandard-an-in-depth-look-at-south-dakota-v-wayfair [http://perma.cc/47F8-NGZP] (“[T]he
physical presence rule . . . has created unfair and unjust marketplace distortions favoring
remote sellers and causing states to lose out on enormous amounts of tax revenue.”).
78 See, e.g., Steven Malanga, Why Wayfair Isn’t Fair, C. J. (June 26, 2018), https://www.cityjournal.org/html/why-wayfair-isnt-fair-15990.html [http://perma.cc/HCW5-UKTA].
79 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2103 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
75
76
77
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In short, the problem is not whether x rule or y loophole is
unfair; the problem is figuring out which rule is less unfair.
But there is an additional (and even more important)
consideration at play in the Wayfair case: stare decisis. In other
words, since the Supreme Court had already established the
bright-line physical presence rule in previous cases, there is an
additional harm we must take into consideration—the macro or
system-wide harms to the rule of law and to the values of
stability and predictability. The problem with this pro-stare
decisis argument, however, is that these justifications for stare
decisis are contested and open to debate. After all, if the
correction of error and the use of reason should trump the past,
why pretend that precedents matter? Why perpetuate the fiction
of stare decisis? Wayfair thus poses a deeper puzzle: Where
should the Justices draw the line between stability (the need to
respect precedent) and change (the need to abandon flawed
precedents or correct errors)?
To sum up, stare decisis is an indeterminate doctrine. It will
always be possible to find or manufacture a good reason for
overturning a precedent case, and it will always be possible to
rebut such a reason. But it takes a theory to beat a theory.80
I will thus present a brief and tentative sketch of a Bayesian
theory of stare decisis below. In summary, instead of attempting
to solve an intractable problem—the inherent tension between
stability and change—my Bayesian approach brings stare decisis’
indeterminacy out in the open.
III. SKETCH OF A POSSIBLE SOLUTION: BAYESIAN VOTING81
The ultimate problem with precedent is due less to the
line-drawing challenges described above82 and more to the system
of majority voting that courts like the U.S. Supreme Court use to
decide cases. The problems with majority voting have been noted
by others.83 In brief, majority voting system can be gamed via
agenda setting and strategic voting. 84 In the context of
horizontal stare decisis, the problem with majority voting is
80 For the origins of this oft-quoted maxim (“it takes a theory to beat a theory”), see
Larry Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: It Takes a Theory to Beat a Theory, LEGAL THEORY
BLOG (Oct. 21, 2012), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2012/10/introduction-it-takesa-theory-to-beat-a-theory-this-is-surely-one-of-the-top-ten-all-time-comments-uttered-bylaw-professo.html [http://perma.cc/QT2D-34YL].
81 For an explanation of Bayes’ theorem on which this model is based, see Joseph
Berkson, Bayes’ Theorem, 1 ANNALS MATHEMATICAL STAT. 42 (1930).
82 See Part II, supra.
83 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV.
802, 802 (1982).
84 Id. at 817–23.
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that each judge must emit a binary vote to either affirm the
precedent case or overturn it. But in truth, the problem of
precedent is a matter of degree.
I thus propose a new approach to horizontal precedent: Bayesian
stare decisis. That is, instead of asking judges to draw an
impossible line between stability and change, why not ask them
to use some alternative voting procedure, one that requires them
to candidly disclose their subjective views regarding the strength
of a contested precedent. Specifically, I would ask the Justices to
consider adopting the following “Bayesian voting” procedure in
which they would openly disclose their subjective evaluations of a
precedent’s vitality by ranking its strength on some fixed scale,
such as the [0, 1] interval.85
The type of Bayesian voting I am proposing here is often
called “range voting” or “utilitarian voting” in the literature on
voting systems.86 I shall call this alternative procedure “Bayesian
voting,”87 or in the context of horizontal precedent, Bayesian
stare decisis. The virtue of this approach is that it candidly
acknowledges the inherently subjective nature of the choice
between stability and change.
In summary, in cases in which the Supreme Court is
considering whether to overturn one of its previous decisions, each
Justice would assign a numerical score reflecting the strength of
the precedent case. To be more precise, this score would reflect the
Justice’s subjective belief in the precedent’s strength. To keep
things simple, this degree of belief could be expressed in numerical
terms anywhere in the range from 0 to 1, or 1 to 10, or some other
uniform scale. The higher the score, the greater the Justice’s
degree of belief in the strength of the precedent case. Let’s use
the 0 to 1 scale to illustrate this idea. A score above 0.5 would
indicate that the precedent is a strong one and should not be
85 In theory, this Bayesian voting procedure could be applied to questions of
precedential scope and to questions of precedential strength. That is, a judge could just as
well use this Bayesian voting procedure to rank a precedent’s strength, i.e., whether a
previous case should be overturned or not, or its scope, i.e., whether statement x is the
holding or dicta. Here, however, I will limit my proposal to the question of strength, i.e., to
cases in which the Court is considering overturning a precedent case.
86 See generally Warren D. Smith, Range Voting (Nov. 28, 2000) (unpublished
manuscript), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=8F0854766344036D6
E9D15E424CFA070?doi=10.1.1.32.9150&rep=rep1&type=pdf [http://perma.cc/4TEF-MK9F];
see also Claude Hillinger, The Case for Utilitarian Voting, 22 HOMO OECONOMICUS [ECON.
MAN] 295, 295 (2005). For a glossary of different voting procedures, see WILLIAM
POUNDSTONE, GAMING THE VOTE: WHY ELECTIONS AREN’T FAIR (AND WHAT WE CAN DO
ABOUT IT) 287–89 (2008).
87 See F. E. Guerra-Pujol, The Case for Bayesian Voting: A Response to Posner
and Vermeule (Jan. 8, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3096881 [http://perma.cc/B3ZS-3337].
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overturned, while a score below 0.5 means that the precedent is
weak and should be overturned. (A score of 0.5 would mean the
judge is undecided about the precedent’s precedential strength.)
Under this alternative system of Bayesian stare decisis, a
precedent would be affirmed if the sum of the Justices’ individual
scores divided by the number of Justices exceeded some threshold
value, say 0.5 if the 0 to 1 scale were used. By contrast, a precedent
would be overturned only if the sum of their individual scores
divided by the number of Justices voting went below 0.5. (In the
event the sum of the Justices’ individual scores divided by the
number of Justices were exactly 0.5, the Court could require a
rehearing of the case.)
My Bayesian approach to precedent recognizes that the
strength or scope of a precedent is always a matter of degree, not
a binary or all-or-nothing question, or in the words of then-Judge
Cardozo, “the duty of a judge [to follow precedent] becomes itself
a question of degree . . . .”88
Of course, Bayesian stare decisis is open to a number of
practical objections.89 Namely, why would the Justices themselves
ever agree to implement such an unorthodox voting procedure?
That said, my immediate purpose here is not to change the
procedures of appellate practice and judging in the short term. My
purpose is simply to question the traditional nature of judicial
voting (majority rule) and demonstrate the subjective nature of
stare decisis in close cases.90
Moreover, Bayesian voting is not so unorthodox. It is a
voting procedure that is commonly used to aggregate collective
preferences in many areas of daily life.91 For instance, “YouTube
and Amazon allow users to rate videos and books on a five-point
scale. The Internet Movie Database (IMDb) has ten-point ratings
of movies.”92 If ordinary people are so accustomed to Bayesian
voting in their everyday activities, such as rating movies and
restaurants, then my proposed voting procedure should be simple
and intuitive enough for the Justices of the Supreme Court.
CARDOZO, supra note 24, at 161.
See Guerra-Pujol, supra note 87, at 4. Due to a page-limit constraint, however, I
will not rehearse these arguments in this Article.
90 I have painted my alternative approach to precedent with a broad brush, since
this symposium is about the Commerce Clause. Nevertheless, I delve into the details of
Bayesian voting and the possibility of Bayesian verdicts in jury trials in my previous
work. See id.; see also generally F. E. Guerra-Pujol, Why Don’t Juries Try Range Voting,
51 CRIM. L. BULL. 68 (2015).
91 See POUNDSTONE, supra note 86, at 233.
92 Id.; see also Claude Hillinger, Science and Ideology in Economic, Political
and Social Thought (Nov. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), ssrn.com/abstract=945947
[http://perma.cc/6HMN-QVJA].
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Before concluding, it is also worth noting that range voting
works best when the same group of people rates all the candidates
or products.93 Bayesian voting is thus an especially appropriate
method for the Justices, since the same group of people (the
Justices) would be rating the strength of a contested precedent.
Lastly, in addition to its simplicity and user-friendly nature,
Bayesian voting methods are difficult to game via strategic voting.
By contrast, when the decisions of the Supreme Court are based on
majority rule, stare decisis will remain open to strategic voting.94
But the chief virtue of my proposed method of Bayesian stare
decisis is this: It candidly acknowledges the inherently indeterminate
and subjective nature of the choice between stability and change.
That is, given the indeterminate nature of precedent, why don’t we
take an openly probabilistic view of precedent? As the Wayfair case
itself shows, there is always some positive probability that a previous
decision might be overturned, or in the words of the great jurist
Oliver Wendell Holmes, “[t]he prophecies of what the courts will do in
fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”95
IV. CONCLUSION
On a previous occasion, I explored the self-referential nature of
stare decisis.96 When a court embraces the doctrine of stare decisis
as an internal rule of procedure, the court’s acceptance of stare
decisis becomes a precedent. Thus, the doctrine of stare decisis, like
any other precedent, can itself be overturned. Nevertheless, it is
highly unlikely that the Supreme Court will abandon this doctrine
anytime soon. Like the power of judicial review97 or the landmark
decision in Brown v. Board of Education,98 the doctrine of stare
decisis has been proclaimed on so many occasions that this doctrine
operates as a super precedent, i.e., it has generated so much reliance

See POUNDSTONE, supra note 86, at 233.
See Michael L. Eber, When the Dissent Creates the Law: Cross-Cutting Majorities
and the Prediction Model of Precedent, 58 EMORY L.J. 207, 207 (2008).
95 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897).
96 See generally F. E. Guerra-Pujol, Is Stare Decisis a Sand Castle?: An Open
Letter to my Law Professor Colleagues, A RIZ . ST. L.J., (online ed. Oct. 1, 2012),
http://arizonastatelawjournal.org/2012/10/01/is-stare-decisis-a-sand-castle-an-open-letterto-my-law-professor-colleagues/ [http://perma.cc/C68J-QFTZ]. Cf. KOZEL, supra note 27, at
172 (“Should the Court give presumptive deference to its precedent about precedent, such
that any revisions to the doctrine of stare decisis must be supported by a special
justification above and beyond disagreement with the doctrine on the merits?”). A decision
overturning stare decisis, however, would produce an even deeper puzzle: Would such a
decision be binding in a future case?
97 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
98 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
93
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and has become so well accepted as to be “practically immune to
reconsideration and reversal.”99
But that said, the development of new Internet applications
and technologies—not only bitcoin but also sex robots, self-driving
cars, and so forth—raises deep and difficult questions about the
meaning of commerce and the wisdom of the Wayfair decision.
Because these new technologies and applications are still evolving
and their future impact unclear, it would be pure speculation on my
part to predict how future courts will apply the Wayfair precedent
to these new technologies and applications going forward. Instead, I
have delved into a deeper problem in this Article—the intractable
tension between stability and change—and I have provided a short
sketch of a possible solution to this problem: Bayesian stare decisis
in place of simple majority voting. My approach has the virtue of
making the subjective nature of stare decisis open and transparent.
Yet, whatever theory of horizontal precedent one prefers, the central
normative or prescriptive question remains the same: How
constraining should stare decisis be? This question is all the more
relevant in light of new Internet applications and technologies.

99

Gerhardt, supra note 31, at 1206.

